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Abstract—In the context of software-defined networking 
(SDN), we address a variant of the controller placement problem 
(CPP), which takes into account the network robustness at both 
control and data plane layers. For given maximum values of 
switch-controller and controller-controller delays at the regular 
state (i.e., when the network is fully operational), the aim is to 
maximize the network robustness against a set of failure states, 
each state defined as a possible malicious attack to multiple 
network nodes. We assume that the attacker knows the data 
plane topology and, therefore, can adopt either one of three 
commonly considered node centrality attacks (based on the node 
degree, closeness or betweenness centralities), or an attack to the 
nodes which are the optimal solution of the critical node 
detection (CND) problem. We propose a set of robustness metrics 
which are used to obtain the optimal solutions for the robust CPP 
variant. We present a set of computational results comparing the 
average delays and robustness values of the robust CPP solutions 
against those minimizing only the average switch-controller and 
controller-controller delays. Moreover, the impact of using the 
CND based attack in the robustness evaluation of CPP solutions 
is also assessed in the computational results. 
Keywords— SDN, controller placement, malicious node attacks, 
integer linear programming 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In SDN networks, the control plane is decoupled from the 
data plane, allowing a more efficient network resource 
management. In its basic configuration, the control plane can 
be implemented by a single controller that is queried by the 
switches for data plane routing decisions. In practice, multiple 
physically distributed controllers must be used to increase 
availability (i.e., to avoid the single point of failure) and 
scalability, both in terms of control flow delay (for larger 
geographical networks) and controller processing load (for 
higher number of switches and/or higher data flow dynamics). 
An immediate concern that arises in a SDN network is the 
number of controllers to be deployed and their placement 
throughout the network. This problem is known as the 
controller placement problem (CPP), a facility location 
problem variant shown to be NP-hard [1]. 
Large scale failures, caused by natural disasters, technical 
related issues or malicious human-made activities, can cause 
serious disruption in telecommunication networks [2]. 
Malicious attacks are becoming a major concern [3] and such 
threats have triggered the interest of network operators to 
evaluate the robustness of their networks. 
The SDN control plane can operate either in a logically 
centralized or a logically distributed mode [4]. In this work, we 
consider a logically centralized control plane with a flat 
controller architecture where all controllers are aware of the 
complete network state (i.e., we consider an active-active back 
up policy for a faster and seamless restoration). Our CPP 
considers the following assumptions. Firstly, the controller 
placement must satisfy given maximum switch-controller (SC) 
and controller-controller (CC) delays to maintain acceptable 
control plane performance in the regular state (i.e., when the 
network is fully operational). Then, since any controller can 
serve as a backup controller in the logically centralized mode, 
we assume that each switch connects to its closest controller 
both in the regular state and in any failure state. Each controller 
is assumed to be collocated to a switch, which is refereed as 
controller node. 
We address the robust CPP against a set of attacks targeting 
the simultaneous shut down of up to ݌ nodes assuming that the 
attacker knows the data plane topology. Moreover, we assume 
that the shutdown of a node includes the shutdown of the 
switch and of the collocated controller in the case of a 
controller node. A vulnerability of SDN networks is that if an 
attacker shuts down all controller nodes, then the entire control 
plane fails. So, we assume the operator requires placing ܥ =
݌ + 1  controllers compliant with the following robustness 
property: in any set of ݌ controller nodes failures, a path in the 
data plane must exist from any surviving switch to the 
surviving controller. In this way, if all ݌ attacked nodes happen 
to be controller nodes, at least one controller node survives and 
the surviving data plane network is still fully connected. 
In a recent work [5], we have addressed a similar problem. 
That work considers node attacks only based on centrality 
metrics and evaluates the network robustness only at the SDN 
control plane layer. Here, we extend that work by considering 
two important issues. Centrality-based metrics are commonly 
used to model malicious attacks [5–6]. Nevertheless, it is well 
known that the critical node detection (CND) problem [7] 
provides solutions that are optimal in the attacker’s perspective 
since they maximally disrupt the data plane network. So, here 
we include the optimal CND solutions as possible attacks in 
the evaluation of CPP solutions. Second, the disruption 
evaluation of a given attack should be performed to both the 
control plane and the data plane. In general, services between 
any two SDN switches can only be maintained when both 
switches can still connect to controllers and also when there is 
at least one switching path between them in the data plane that 
survives the attack. So, in this work, the selection of the best 
robust CPP solutions considers a set of robustness metrics that 
also includes the data plane disruption evaluation. 
In order to assess the delay penalties of robust controller 
placements when compared with their non-robust counterparts, 
we also describe how CPP solutions minimizing only the 
average SC and CC delays can be optimally computed through 
integer linear programming. Moreover, the impact of using the 
CND based attacks in the robustness evaluation is also assessed 
in the computational results. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
related work. Section III shows how the non-robust CPP 
solutions minimizing average SC and CC delays are computed. 
Section IV describes an enumeration method to obtain a set of 
robust CPP solutions. Section V describes how CPP solutions 
are evaluated in order to obtain the best robust solutions. 
Section VI presents and discusses the computational results. 
Finally, Section VII presents the main conclusions of the work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
For a given network, Critical Node Detection (CND) 
problems aim to optimally remove a subset of nodes (the 
critical nodes) in order to optimize or achieve a given network 
degradation metric. CND problems have been considered in 
different contexts [7–8] and are gaining special attention in the 
evaluation of telecommunication networks to large-scale 
disasters [9–10] by using the optimal solution of CND as the 
network vulnerability metric. Moreover, recent works use CND 
to enhance the network robustness to multiple node failures. In 
[11], the authors optimally select a set of r nodes that must be 
made robust in order to maximally improve the vulnerability of 
the network given by CND. In [12], the authors consider the 
addition of new links, within a given budget, to a transparent 
optical network so that the CND evaluation of the resulting 
topology is maximally improved. 
Most literature on CPP aims at minimizing SC delays 
without addressing failure resilience. In [13], the authors aim at 
minimizing combinations of average and maximum delays and 
also consider load balancing of the controllers. In [14], the 
authors aim at optimizing several objectives (number of 
controllers, maximum SC delay, maximum CC delay and 
controller load imbalance) providing solutions based on search 
methods for different objective combinations, on a software 
platform named POCO. The CC delay is also an important 
requirement in the logically centralized control plane, 
supported for example by the two major SDN implementations 
ONOS [15] and ODL [16], to guarantee efficient controller 
synchronization for consistency reasons. However, minimizing 
the average SC and CC delays are conflicting objectives [17] 
since considering more controllers will, in general, decrease the 
average SC delay but increase the average CC delay. 
Different works have addressed the issue of making the 
CPP more resilient to failures. In [18], the authors first address 
the CPP for the regular state, minimizing the number of 
controllers, while guaranteeing maximum values for the SC 
and CC delays. Then, they address a resilient CPP variant 
assuming that switches reconnect to the closest surviving 
controller when they lose connectivity with their primary 
controller. Controllers are assumed to fail with a given 
probability and the average SC delays take into account these 
failure probabilities. The objective is a combination of 
minimizing the number of controllers and the average SC 
delays. This work considers only failures on the control plane. 
In [19], a CPP is proposed in order to guarantee two node 
disjoint paths from each switch to its primary controller, and 
another CPP is proposed guaranteeing node disjoint paths from 
each switch to its primary and to its backup controller. These 
CPP solutions show enhanced robustness with small SC delay 
penalties. In [20], the resilient capacitated CPP is addressed 
considering multiple controller failures where each switch has 
a given traffic load and controllers have an associated capacity. 
An Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model minimizing the 
number of controllers is proposed. The ILP guarantees (i) the 
assignment of ݎ  controllers to each switch and (ii) given 
maximum values for the SC and CC delays. Then, the ILP can 
be extended to ensure that all control paths of each switch are 
link-disjoint. Both [19–20] consider only single link and/or 
node failures at the SDN data plane. 
The authors in [6] address targeted attacks to a SDN 
network. Assuming that the attacker has knowledge of the data 
plane topology but is unaware of the controller locations, the 
network vulnerabilities to centrality-based attacks are studied. 
The controller placements are proposed to be the least critical 
nodes, i.e., the nodes less chosen by the different attacks. In 
[21], the CPP is addressed for a multiple failure scenario where 
the SDN controller locations are based on a failure correlation 
assessment of network nodes and links. The authors consider 
different types of minimal cut sets composed of nodes and/or 
links, to assess the network unavailability. 
III. THE NON-ROBUST CPP 
Consider a data plane network represented by a directed 
graph ܩ஺ = (ܰ, ܣ), where ܰ is the set of nodes and ܣ is the set 
of directed links. The number of nodes is given by ݊ = |ܰ| and 
the directed link from node ݅ to node ݆ is given by arc (݅, ݆). 
The set of the adjacent nodes of ݅ is denoted as ܸ(݅). Given the 
propagation delay of each arc, the shortest path delay between 
nodes ݅ and ݆ is pre-computed and denoted as ݀௜௝ . 
The non-robust CPP focuses on the regular state, aiming to 
optimize the control plane performance, by minimizing either 
the average SC delay or the average CC delay [5]. We further 
assume that the SC delay between any switch and its primary 
controller does not exceed a given ܦ௦௖ , and that the CC delay 
between any two controllers does not exceed a given ܦ௖௖ . 
Consider the decision variables given by: 
ݕ௜ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if a controller is placed 
in ݅  (i.e., node ݅  is a controller node) and 0 
otherwise (i.e., node ݅ is a switch) 
ݖ௜௝ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if the primary controller 
of switch ݅ is placed in node ݆, and 0 otherwise 
ܿ௜௝ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if one controller is 
placed in ݅ and another controller is placed in ݆, 
and 0 otherwise (this means that  ܿ௜௝ = ݕ௜ ⋅ ݕ௝) 
 
The following ILP constraints define the set of all feasible 
CPP solutions: 
∑ ݕ௜௜∈ே = ܥ   (1) 
∑ ݕ௝௝:ௗ೔ೕஸ஽ೞ೎ ≥ 1  ݅ ∈ ܰ (2) 
ݕ௜ + ݕ௝ ≤ 1  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ\{݅}: ݀௜௝ > ܦ௖௖  (3) 
∑ ݖ௜௝௝:ௗ೔ೕஸ஽ೞ೎ = 1  ݅ ∈ ܰ (4) 
ݖ௜௝ ≤ ݕ௝  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ (5) 
ܿ௜௝ ≤ ݕ௜   ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆ (6a) 
ܿ௜௝ ≤ ݕ௝  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆ (6b) 
ܿ௜௝ ≥ ݕ௜ + ݕ௝ − 1  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆ (6c) 
ݕ௜ ∈ {0,1} ݅ ∈ ܰ (7a) 
ݖ௜௝ ∈ {0,1}  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݀௜௝ ≤ ܦ௦௖  (7b) 
ܿ௜௝ ∈ {0,1}  ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆  (7c) 
Constraint (1) guarantees the placement of ܥ  controllers. 
Constraints (2) guarantee that for each node ݅ ∈ ܰ, there must 
exist at least one controller placed in a node distanced at most 
	ܦ௦௖  from ݅  (guaranteeing the maximum SC delay), and 
constraints (3) guarantee that any pair of controllers are not 
placed in nodes distanced more than ܦ௖௖  from each other 
(guaranteeing the maximum CC delay). Constraints (4–5) 
guarantee that each node ݅ has exactly one primary controller 
in a node distanced at most ܦ௦௖  and, when used, render 
constraints (2) redundant.  Constraints (6) are the linearization 
of the equalities ܿ௜௝ = ݕ௜ ⋅ ݕ௝  and constraints (7) are variable 
domain constraints. For each feasible solution, the average SC 
delay of the ݊ − ܥ nodes not hosting a controller is given by  
௦݂௖ =
1
݊ − ܥ෍ ෍ ݀௜௝ݖ௜௝௝∈ே\{௜}௜∈ே
 
while the average CC delay of the ܥ(ܥ − 1)/2 controller node 
pairs is given by 
௖݂௖ =
2
ܥ(ܥ − 1)෍ ෍ ݀௜௝ܿ௜௝௝∈ே:௜ழ௝௜∈ே
 
The aim is to optimize the SC and CC delays, which are 
conflicting objectives [17]. The joint optimization of these 
objectives is a bi-objective optimization problem, which has 
multiple optimal solutions, known as Pareto solutions. In this 
work, we consider only the two Pareto opposites defined as: 
MinAvgSC optimization problem that first minimizes ௦݂௖ 
subject to (1–7) and, then, minimizes ௖݂௖ subject to 
(1–7) and guaranteeing the minimum value of ௦݂௖ 
MinAvgCC optimization problem that first minimizes ௖݂௖ 
subject to (1–7) and, then, minimizes ௦݂௖ subject to 
(1–7) and guaranteeing the minimum value of ௖݂௖ 
 The solution of each problem is determined by solving in 
sequence two ILP models. In our instances, both problems 
were efficiently solved (we used CPLEX 12.6.1 ILP solver) 
with total runtime always below 6 seconds in all cases. 
IV. ENUMERATION OF ROBUST CPP SOLUTIONS 
In order to enumerate the robust CPP solutions with ܥ =
݌ + 1  controllers, we first describe through integer linear 
programming the set of feasible solutions where the robustness 
property is imposed: in any set of ݌ controller nodes failures, a 
path in the data plane must exist from any surviving switch to 
the surviving controller. Consider the previous variables ݕ௜  and 
the following integer variables: 
ݔ௜௝௞ ∈ ଴ܰା non-negative integer variable indicating the 
number of paths that include arc (݅, ݆)  from 
switch ݇ to all controller nodes 
Following [5], the following constraints define the set of all 
robust CPP solutions: 
(1–3), (7a) 
∑ ൫ݔ௜௝௞ − ݔ௝௜௞൯௝∈௏(௜) ≤ ݕ௜   ݇ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ\{݇} (8) 
∑ ൫ݔ௜௝௞ − ݔ௝௜௞൯௝∈௏(௜) ≥ 0  ݇ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ\{݇} (9) 
∑ ݔ௜௝௞௝∈௏(௜) ≤ ܥ(1 − ݕ௜)  ݇ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ (10) 
∑ ݔ௝௜௞௝∈௏(௜) ≥ ݕ௜ − ݕ௞   ݇ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ\{݇} (11) 
ݔ௜௞௞ = 0  ݇ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܸ(݇) (12) 
ݔ௜௝௞ ∈ ℕ଴ା  ݇ ∈ ܰ, (݅, ݆) ∈ ܣ (13) 
Constraints (8–13) guarantee the robustness property. For 
each node ݇ ∈ ܰ: 
• if node ݅ ∈ ܰ\{݇} is not a controller node (i.e., 	ݕ௜ = 0), 
constraints (8–9) become the usual path conservation 
constraints and constraints (10–11) become redundant;  
• if node ݅ ∈ ܰ is a controller node	(i.e., ݕ௜ = 1), constraints 
(10) guarantee that there is no outgoing arc in node ݅ (to 
ensure that no path includes intermediate controller nodes) 
and constraints (8–9,11) guarantee that there is exactly one 
path ending at node ݅ (to ensure that there is a path from ݇ 
to each controller node). 
In addition, constraints (12) guarantee that there is no path 
originating at ݇  that ends at ݇ , and constraints (13) are the 
variable domain constraints  of variables ݔ௜௝௞ . 
In order to enumerate all robust CPP solutions, the 
approach in [5] is used. A flowchart with the enumeration 
method is presented in Fig. 1. First, the optimal solution of the 
following ILP model is computed: 
Maximize ∑ ߛ௜ݕ௜௜∈ே  (14) 
Subject to  
(1–3), (7a), (8–13) 
where coefficients ߛ௜  of the objective function (14) are the 
nodes’ closeness centrality metric (motivated by the 
assumption that nodes with higher closeness centrality are 
more promising candidates for placing controllers). Then, we 
use a random walk procedure to compute many new robust 
CPP solutions. The random walk randomly swaps a controller 
from its current node location to an available adjacent node that 
does not yet host a controller. If the generated solution is new 
(i.e., it has not been previously found) and feasible (given by 
the feasibility test), the random walk procedure continues with 
the new solution; otherwise, it discards the solution and goes 
back to the previous one. The random walk ends when a 
maximum number ܫ୫ୟ୶ of solutions are discarded. 
 
Fig. 1. Flow chart of the enumeration method. 
When no new solution can be computed by the random 
walk, for each obtained CPP solution {ߩଵ, … , ߩ஼}, a constraint 
is added to the ILP model in the form:  
ݕఘభ + ⋯+ ݕఘ಴	 ≤ ܥ − 1	
to remove it from the feasible set of solutions and the whole 
process is repeated (i.e., we solve again the ILP model and 
based on its optimal solution, we run again the random walk). 
The whole enumeration method stops when the ILP model is 
infeasible (which means the complete set of robust feasible 
CPP solutions was found) or when a pre-defined number of 
CPP solutions, defined as ܮ୫ୟ୶, is reached. 
The feasibility test of a solution has polynomial 
complexity. First, the maximum ܦ௦௖  and ܦ௖௖  delays in the 
regular state are straightforwardly checked with the shortest 
path delays ݀௜௝  between all pairs of nodes of graph ܩ. Then, we 
start by eliminating from ܩ all outgoing arcs (݅, ݆) of all nodes 
݅  hosting a controller, and then running a shortest path 
algorithm between all node pairs in the new graph, which has 
complexity ࣩ(݊ଷ). To check if there is a path in the SDN data 
plane between any switch and any controller node, we just 
need to verify if the shortest path from every switch to every 
controller node is less than infinity. 
V. EVALUATION OF THE ROBUST CPP SOLUTIONS 
In order to evaluate the robustness of a controller placement 
solution, as the robust ones determined by the enumeration 
method (Section III) or the MinAvgSC and MinAvgCC 
solutions (Section II), we first select the malicious attacks of 
interest targeting up to ݌ node shutdowns. Then, we propose a 
set of robustness metrics and evaluate each controller 
placement by computing its robustness metric values for the 
considered attacks of interest. At the end, based on the 
robustness metric values of each solution, the selection of the 
controller placements with the best robustness values is 
straightforward. 
A. Modelling Malicious Node Attacks 
We assume the attacker has full knowledge of the SDN 
data plane topology, but is unaware of the controller locations.  
Under this assumption, we consider that the attacker can adopt 
either a node centrality based attack or an attack to the nodes 
which are the optimal solution of the CND problem. 
The different centrality measures give different information 
concerning network connectivity. Three node centrality 
measures are considered: (i) node degree, i.e., nodes with the 
largest number of neighbors are preferred; (ii) closeness 
centrality, i.e., nodes closest to all other nodes are preferred; 
and (iii) betweenness centrality, i.e., nodes serving the largest 
number of shortest paths are preferred. In each of these attacks, 
the nodes with greatest centrality value are preferred since 
shutting them down should cause major network disruption in 
from the attacker’s perspective. To select the ݌ nodes for shut 
down, the centrality measures are first computed in the 
complete network graph. Then, for each centrality measure, the 
node with greatest centrality value is selected and removed 
from the graph, the centrality node values are recomputed for 
the remaining graph and the process is repeated until ݌ nodes 
are selected. 
In the context of our problem, we consider the CND 
problem variant aiming to identify a set of ݌ nodes in the data 
plane network that when shutdown maximizes the number of 
node pairs that become disconnected. CND can be formulated 
as an ILP model as follows. Consider the data plane network 
represented by the undirected graph ܩா = (ܰ, ܧ), where ܧ  is 
the set of undirected links and each link is given by (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ 
with ݅ < ݆. Consider ܸ(݅) as the set of neighboring nodes of ݅ 
in ܩா. Also consider the following auxiliary sets: the set of all 
node pairs ܶ = {(݅, ݆) ∈ ܰ × ܰ: ݅ < ݆}; the complementary set 
of ܧ  given by ܧ௖ = {(݅, ݆) ∈ ܶ: (݅, ݆) ∉ ܧ} ; and set ܸ(݅, ݆) 
defined as ܸ(݅) if |ܸ(݅)| ≤ |ܸ(݆)|, or ܸ(݆) otherwise. Consider 
the decision variables given by: 
ݒ௜ ∈ {0,1}  binary variable that is set to 1 if node ݅  is 
selected as a critical node, and 0 otherwise 
ݑ௜௝ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is set to 1 if nodes ݅ and ݆ 
are connected when the critical nodes are 
removed, and 0 otherwise (݅ < ݆) 
For readability purposes, both ݑ௜௝  and ݑ௝௜  appear in the 
following formulation but they represent the same variable ݑ௜௝ 
with ݅ < ݆. Following [10], CND is defined by: 
Minimize ∑ ݑ௜௝(௜,௝)∈்  (14) 
Subject to: 
∑ ݒ௜௜∈ே = ݌   (15) 
ݑ௜௝ + ݒ௜ + ݒ௝ ≥ 1  (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ (16) 
ݑ௜௝ ≥ ݑ௜௞ + ݑ௝௞ − 1 + ݒ௞  (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ௖, ݇ ∈ ܸ(݅, ݆) (17) 
ݒ௜ ∈ {0,1}  ݅ ∈ ܰ (18a) 
ݑ௜௝ ∈ {0,1}  (݅, ݆) ∈ ܶ (18b) 
The objective function (14) is the minimization of the 
number of node pairs that remain connected when the critical 
nodes are removed. Constraint (15) imposes that exactly ݌ 
critical nodes are selected. Constraints (16) guarantee that if 
there is a link between nodes ݅ and ݆, then they are connected if 
none of them are critical. Constraints (17) guarantee that for 
nodes ݅ and ݆ that are not critical and do not share a link, then 
they are connected if a neighbor node ݇  of one of them is 
connected to the other. Constraints (18) are the variable 
domain constraints. In our computational instances, CND is 
efficiently solved (we used CPLEX 12.6.1 ILP solver) with 
total runtime always below 4 seconds in all cases. 
Note that each malicious attack is defined by a set of p 
nodes that are selected by the attacker to be shut down and this 
set is computed based only on the data plane topology. So, the 
set of p nodes of each attack are computed only once for each 
data plane topology. Consider the set ܯ  = {1,2,3,4} 
representing all attacks such that ݉ = 1,2,3 represent the node 
degree, closeness and betweenness based attack, respectively, 
and ݉ = 4  represents the CND based attack. In order to 
compare the robustness evaluation with and without the CND 
based attack, we represent by ܯ′ the subset composed by only 
the centrality-based attacks, i.e., ܯ′ = {1,2,3}. 
B. Evaluation of CPP Solutions 
Recall that for a given data plane network, a CPP solution 
is a set of C nodes that host a controller each. Consider ܩ௠ as 
the surviving graph to the malicious attack ݉ ∈ ܯ, i.e., when 
the p nodes of attack m are eliminated from the data plane 
graph. To evaluate each CPP solution, we consider three 
robustness metrics. 
The first metric is the switch pair connectivity metric ݊௦௣. 
To compute this metric, we first determine ݊௦௣௠ , given by the 
number of switch pairs that are connected in ܩ௠  and both 
switches can connect to a SDN controller. Then, we define 
݊௦௣ = min௠∈ெ ݊௦௣
௠ . This is the most important robustness metric. It 
represents the minimum number of switch pairs that are still 
able to support data flows amongst all considered malicious 
attacks and the aim is to find the CPP solution that maximizes 
it. 
If multiple solutions have the maximum metric value ݊௦௣, 
then the second metric, the switch-controller metric ݊௦௖ , is 
considered. To compute this metric, we first determine ݊௦௖௠  
given by the number of switches that can connect to a 
surviving controller distanced at most ܦ௦௖  in ܩ௠ . Then, we 
define ݊௦௖ = min௠∈ெ ݊௦௖
௠ . This is the second most important 
robustness metric. It represents the minimum number of 
switches with available SDN control plane within the 
maximum SC delay amongst all considered malicious attacks. 
Finally, if multiple solutions have the maximum metric 
values ݊௦௣  and ݊௦௖ , the third proposed metric is the primary 
controller metric ݊௣௖ . To compute this metric, we first 
determine ݊௣௖௠  given by the number of switches whose closest 
controller in ܩ௠  is its primary controller (i.e., is the closest 
controller before attack m). Then, we define ݊௣௖ = min௠∈ெ ݊௣௖
௠ . 
This metric represents the number of switches that do not 
require a change of their primary controller avoiding temporary 
control plane disruption. 
Note that the determination of ݊௦௣௠ , ݊௦௖௠  and ݊௣௖௠  for each 
݉ ∈ ܯ is polynomial since these values can be computed with 
the shortest path lengths between every node pair and these 
lengths are computed by running a shortest path algorithm 
between all node pairs in ܩ௠ (which has complexity ࣩ(݊ଷ)). 
VI. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
In this section, we present a comparison analysis between 
the non-robust optimal CPP solutions and the best robust CPP 
solutions in terms of average delays versus robustness to 
malicious node attacks. Moreover, the influence of using the 
CND based attack in the robustness evaluation of all CPP 
solutions is also assessed. All methods were implemented in 
C++, using CPLEX 12.6 callable libraries running 8 threads. 
All problem instances were solved on a 16 core server with 64 
GB of RAM running Windows OS. To define the instances for 
the computational results, two topologies were considered as 
SDN data plane networks: Germany50 with 50 nodes, 88 
undirected links and an average node degree of 3.52, depicted 
in Figure 2 (sndlib.zib.de) and CORONET CONUS with 75 
nodes, 99 undirected links and an average node degree of 2.64, 
depicted in Figure 3 (www.monarchna.com/ topology.html).  
 
Fig. 2. Germany50 with 50 nodes and 88 links. 
 
Fig. 3. CORONET CONUS with 75 nodes and 99 links. 
As in [5], given the geographical coordinates of the nodes, 
each link length was computed as the shortest distance between 
its two end nodes, over the Earth’s surface. Moreover, the 
delay between two nodes ݀௜௝  is given by the shortest path 
length between them. The maximum delay requirements ܦ௦௖ 
and ܦ௖௖ are given as percentages of the graph diameter, which 
is given by the largest delay between any pair of nodes in the 
network. The graph diameter for Germany50 is 934 km, while 
for CORONET CONUS is 6472 km. The values used for the 
number of attacked nodes ݌ are 3, 5 and 7. Since ܥ = ݌ + 1, 
the number of controllers is 4, 6 and 8, respectively. For each 
value of ܥ, three sets of ܦ௦௖ ,ܦ௖௖  values have been considered 
(presented in Table I), representing different tradeoffs between 
the SC and CC delays. These sets of values were chosen to be 
tight, while guaranteeing that the non-robust and robust 
problems were still feasible resulting in a total number of 9 
problem instances for each network topology. 
TABLE I.  MAXIMUM DELAYS OF EACH PROBLEM  INSTANCE  
Instance ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
࡯ 4 4 4 6 6 6 8 8 8 
Germany50 
ࡰ࢙ࢉ (%) 30 35 40 25 30 35 20 25 30
ࡰࢉࢉ (%) 60 40 35 65 60 40 75 65 60
CORONET 
CONUS 
ࡰ࢙ࢉ (%) 30 35 40 20 25 30 20 25 30
ࡰࢉࢉ (%) 55 40 30 80 55 50 65 55 50
 
Based on preliminary tests, the maximum number ܮ୫ୟ୶ of 
CPP solutions in the enumeration method (see Section IV) was 
set to 100000 and the maximum number ܫ୫ୟ୶ of consecutive 
solution discards by the random walk was set to 10000.  
The optimal non-robust CPP solutions were obtained by 
solving MinAvgSC and MinAvgCC (see Section II). For each of 
these two solutions, besides the average SC and CC delays 
(given by the optimal values of the objective functions), their 
robustness metrics ݊௦௣ , ݊௦௖  and ݊௣௖ were also computed as 
described in Section V.B. The robustness parameters were 
computed both against the set ܯ of attacks (which include the 
CND based attack) and against the subset ܯ′ (composed only 
by the centrality-based attacks). Then, the best robust CPP 
solutions were computed. For each solution, besides the 
robustness metrics ݊௦௣, ݊௦௖ and ݊௣௖ (computed as described in 
Section V), their average SC and CC delays were also 
computed. Like in the non-robust CPP solutions, the robustness 
parameters were computed both against the set ܯ  of attacks 
and against the subset ܯ′. 
Table II presents the obtained robustness metric values of 
all solutions for the nine Germany50 network instances. 
Column ‘ID’ identifies the instance ID (as defined in Table I) 
and column ‘݌’ identifies the number of attacked nodes (recall 
that ܥ = ݌ + 1). The last row of Table II presents the average 
values of each column which enable us to compare the 
robustness of the different CPP solutions. 
The results presented in Table II highlight the impact of 
using the CND based attack in the robustness evaluation of all 
controller placement solutions. When only centrality-based 
attacks are considered, the main robustness metric value ݊௦௣௠  is 
much higher than that value when considering all attacks, 
misleading us to conclude that the network is much more 
robust to malicious node attacks than it really is. As a 
consequence, when only centrality-based attacks are 
considered, all robustness metric values are very similar, on 
average, for the MinAvgSC and MinAvgCC non-robust 
solutions. Moreover, the best robust CPP solution can only 
improve the least important robustness metric values ݊௦௖௠  and ݊௣௖௠  when compared with the non-robust solutions. 
On the other hand, when all attacks are considered (i.e., 
including CND), we observe that the MinAvgSC solution is 
more robust in the main robustness metric value ݊௦௣௠  than the 
MinAvgCC solution. Note that minimizing the average SC 
delay spreads out the controllers while minimizing the average 
CC delay tends to concentrate controllers in the center of the 
network. So, the results indicate that having more spread out 
controllers makes the solutions more robust to malicious node 
attacks. Finally and more importantly, the best robust CPP 
solutions are now able to improve, on average, all robustness 
metric values, when compared with the previous non-robust 
CPP solutions. Although these improvements are more 
significant for the robustness metric values ݊௦௖௠  and ݊௣௖௠ , there 
are also cases where the main robustness metric value ݊௦௣௠  is 
also improved. Overall, by including the CND based attack in 
the robustness evaluation, besides obtaining a more accurate 
evaluation, we are able to compute more robust CPP solutions. 
Table III presents the obtained robustness parameters of all 
solutions for the nine CORONET CONUS network instances. 
Like in the previous case, when only centrality-based attacks 
are considered (set M’), the main robustness metric value ݊௦௣௠  
is much higher than that value when considering all attacks (set 
M). Now, in both cases (either considering M’ or M), we 
observe that the MinAvgSC solution is more robust in all 
robustness metric values than the MinAvgCC solution. Recall 
that CORONET CONUS topology has a much lower average 
node degree than Germany50. This means that more spread out 
controllers make the solutions even more robust to malicious 
node attacks for network topologies with lower average node 
degrees. Moreover, when all attacks are considered, the best 
robust CPP solutions are able to improve only slightly, on 
average, the main robustness metric value ݊௦௣௠  when compared 
with the MinAvgSC solution but it improves significantly the 
other two robustness metric values. 
So far, we have shown that the method proposed to 
compute the best robust CPP solutions can provide solutions 
more robust than those minimizing only the average SC and 
CC delays. Now, let us focus on the average SC and CC delay 
penalties of the best robust CPP solutions. 
Figure 4 presents as bar charts the average SC delays of 
MinAvgSC solutions, best robust CPP solutions against set M' 
and against set M for all instances of both networks. As 
expected, the average SC delays of the robust CPP solutions 
are always higher than the optimal values of the MinAvgSC 
solutions. Nevertheless, the delay penalties are small in all 
cases showing that the improved robustness against malicious 
node attacks does not significantly degrade the SDN control 
plane performance in the regular state concerning switch-
controller delays. Another interesting observation from these 
results is that the robust CPP solutions obtained by including 
the CND based attack do not necessarily have higher average 
SC delays since there are some cases where the delay penalties 
of the CPP solutions against set M are lower than those of the 
CPP solutions against set M’. 
Figure 5 presents as bar charts the average CC delays of 
MinAvgCC solutions, best robust CPP solutions against set M' 
and against set M for all instances of both networks. As before, 
the average CC delays of the robust CPP solutions are always 
higher than the optimal values of the MinAvgCC solutions. In 
these cases though, the CC delay penalties are more significant 
in some instances than in the previous cases, showing that, as 
already observed before, the more robust solutions tend to 
require more spread out controllers, which in turn, impose 
higher average delays between controllers. Note though, that 
the average CC delays might not be so relevant in practice 
TABLE II.  ROBUSTNESS PARAMETERS OF THE NON-ROBUST AND ROBUST SOLUTIONS FOR GERMANY50 
  Centrality based Attacks (M’) Centrality + CND based Attacks (M) 
  MinAvgSC MinAvgCC Robust CPP MinAvgSC MinAvgCC Robust CPP 
ID ࢖ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ
1 
3 
1081 44 42 1081 47 41 1081 47 47 711 36 28 711 40 39 711 44 41 
2 1081 34 29 1081 34 29 1081 34 29 666 34 29 666 34 29 666 34 29 
3 1081 47 29 1081 47 37 1081 47 46 666 37 30 666 37 34 711 45 32 
4 
5 
990 28 24 990 39 37 990 43 39 496 28 24 496 37 34 496 43 39 
5 990 33 28 990 38 29 990 44 43 496 33 28 496 38 29 496 44 40 
6 990 37 29 990 39 30 990 42 26 496 37 29 171 19 18 496 40 26 
7 
7 
441 29 24 441 23 18 441 34 31 301 29 24 181 23 18 301 34 31 
8 441 31 24 441 30 25 441 40 37 301 31 24 301 30 25 301 40 35 
9 441 26 19 441 31 16 441 40 36 301 26 19 301 31 16 301 40 35 
Avg: 837.3 34.3 27.6 837.3 36.4 29.1 837.3 41.2 37.1 492.7 32.3 26.1 443.2 32.1 26.9 497.7 40.4 34.2
TABLE III. ROBUSTNESS PARAMETERS OF THE NON-ROBUST AND ROBUST SOLUTIONS FOR CORONET CONUS 
  Centrality based Attacks (M’) Centrality + CND based Attacks (M) 
  MinAvgSC MinAvgCC Robust CPP MinAvgSC MinAvgCC Robust CPP 
ID ࢖ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ ࢔࢙࢖ ࢔࢙ࢉ ࢔࢖ࢉ
1 
3 
2485 69 62 2485 67 37 2485 71 65 2016 64 62 2016 64 37 2016 64 64 
2 2485 49 33 2485 66 52 2485 68 63 2016 49 33 2016 64 52 2016 64 63 
3 2485 56 39 2485 56 38 2485 56 39 2016 56 39 2016 56 38 2016 56 39 
4 
5 
1191 49 45 1191 60 57 1191 61 59 983 49 45 983 60 57 983 61 59 
5 1191 59 48 1191 60 49 1191 60 49 973 59 48 973 60 49 973 60 49 
6 1191 65 53 561 32 31 1191 65 54 973 63 53 561 32 31 974 64 56 
7 
7 
849 50 48 849 63 60 849 64 61 610 50 48 620 63 60 620 64 61 
8 849 64 53 849 61 48 849 64 55 620 64 53 610 61 48 620 64 54 
9 771 55 47 561 32 30 771 55 52 620 55 47 430 32 30 620 55 52 
Avg: 1499.7 57.3 47.6 1406.3 55.2 44.7 1499.7 62.7 55.2 1203.0 56.6 47.6 1136.1 54.7 44.7 1204.2 61.3 55.2
since the maximum CC delay (parameter ܦ௖௖  imposed in all 
CPP solutions) is the main parameter that impacts the 
synchronization efficiency between controllers [17] and the 
average CC delays of the solutions are all well below the 
maximum value considered for each instance. As a final 
remark, the conclusion drawn before between the delay 
penalties of the CPP solutions computed against set M and 
against set M’ also stands in this case, i.e., the robust CPP 
solutions obtained by including the CND based attack have 
lower average CC delays in some of the instances.  
 
Germany50 
 
CORONET CONUS 
Fig. 4. Average SC delays of the MinAvgSC solutions (white columns), best 
robust CPP solutions against set ܯ′ (grey columns) and against set ܯ (dark 
grey columns) for all instances of Germany50 (top) and CORONET CONUS 
(bottom). 
 
Germany50 
 
CORONET CONUS 
Fig. 5. Average CC delays of the MinAvgCC solutions (white columns), best 
robust CPP solutions against set ܯ′ (grey columns) and against set ܯ (dark 
grey columns) for all instances of Germany50 (top) and CORONET CONUS 
(bottom). 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The robustness of SDN networks to malicious node attacks 
requires both the data plane and the control plane disruption 
evaluation. This is because services between any two SDN 
switches can only be maintained when both switches can still 
connect to controllers, and also when there is at least one path 
between them in the data plane that survives the attack. To this 
aim, we have addressed a variant of CPP which takes into 
account the network robustness at both control and data plane 
levels. For given maximum values of SC and CC delays at the 
regular state, the aim of our CPP variant was to maximize the 
SDN robustness against a set of failure states, each one given 
by a possible malicious attack to multiple nodes. 
We have assumed that the attacker knows the data plane 
topology and, therefore, can adopt either one of three 
commonly considered node centrality attacks (node degree, 
node centrality of node betweenness) or an attack to the nodes 
which are the optimal solution of the CND problem. 
We have also described how CPP solutions minimizing 
only the average SC and CC delays can be optimally computed 
through integer linear programming. Then, in the 
computational results, a comparison analysis has been 
conducted between the non-robust and best robust CPP 
solutions in terms of average delays versus robustness to 
malicious node attacks. The computational results have shown 
that enhanced robustness against malicious attacks to multiple 
nodes are obtained with small average SC delay penalties while 
the CC delay penalties might be more significant although well 
below the required maximum values. 
Concerning the impact of using the CND based attack in 
the robustness evaluation of controller placements, the 
computational results have shown that it enables to compute 
more robust CPP solutions. Moreover, the results have also 
shown that the robustness evaluation becomes more accurate 
with the CND based attack since when we only consider 
centrality-based attacks, the switch pair connectivity metric ݊௦௣ 
is much higher than that value when considering all attacks, 
misleading us to conclude that the network is much more 
robust to malicious node attacks than it really is. 
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